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The Brazilian Interest Rate Equalization System (IRES) subsidizes farmers by providing 
them with credit at lower than market interest rates.  The objective of this research is to evaluate the 
IRES by comparing its monetary cost  with its benefits as measured by Brazilian  GDP  growth. 
Estimates are carried out using input-output matrix. The results suggest that each Brazilian real spent 
by IRES to assist Brazilian family farms increases Brazilian GDP by R$ 1.75 and that each real spent 
to assist commercial farms increases GDP by R$ 3.57. The IRES is a subsidy that generates economic 
growth greater than its cost to society. 
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1 - Introduction 
Macroeconomic policies adopted  in Brazil over the latest decade have transferred resources 
from farmers to consumers,  thereby reducing the farming sector’s stock of capital and increasing 
unemployment, poverty, and income concentration (Teixeira and Carvalho, 2004). To improve farmer 
access to credit and redress income distribution disparities, the interest rate  on loans made to 
agricultural sector entities has been artificially reduced over the last decade. A great majority of this 
reduction is a result the Brazilian Interest Rate Equalization System (IRES). About 30% of the total 
loans available to farmers by the Brazilian Central Bank are impacted by IRES. Losses to banks that 
lend at below market interest rates to IRES qualified agricultural entities are reimbursed by the 
Brazilian government. 
In the 1970s, rural credit subsidies increased farmer income and land ownership concentration 
in the agriculture sector,  which lead to the justifiable criticism that this government intervention 
benefited a specific population group while the costs ware borne by the entire Brazilian population. 
The credit subsidies were also criticized for their distributive and allocative inefficiencies.  
Theory and empirical works supporting these criticisms  only address the subsidies’ direct 
effects and ignore indirect effects that arise from the linkage between the sector receiving the subsidy 
and the economy’s others sectors. According to Hirschman’s T heory of Unbalanced Growth, 
increasing activity in one sector demands that production factors also increase, thereby stimulating 
investment in ancillary sectors: a chain reaction in which development of one sector stimulates the 
development of others.  
Unbalanced Growth can occur naturally or can be encouraged by external factors and 
generates direct and indirect effects often promoting growth in a country’s GDP, which can be greater 
than the subsidy itself. The Brazilian government’s bias toward stable rural employment and reducing 
rural emigration has led to programs directly benefiting the Brazilian agriculture sector and would 
have a economic reasoning. In spite of a general weakening  of Brazilian  government economic intervention and the 
unsatisfactory results from earlier interventions in the agricultural sector, policies that transfer large 
amounts of resources to  farmers continue to exist  in  many countries (Coelho, 2001). According to 
Taylor (1994), incentives directed toward agricultural sector, especially when they cause rural income 
to increase, can have a positive impact on non-agricultural sectors and drive economic development. 
The objective of the current research is to determine the impacts of IRES expenditures on Brazilian 
GDP, taking into consideration both direct and indirect effects.  
This work is organized as follows: Section 2 p resents the empirical framework; Section 3  




  This paper measures the direct and indirect effects of Brazilian government IRES expenditures 
using income multipliers from the 1995  IBGE  Input-Output table. IRES makes subsidized credit 
available to farmers for the purchase of production factors, considered to be variable factors (seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides and lime), based on a production costs spreadsheet, and for investment in durable 
production factors, such as tractors, machinery, vehicles, etc. This method permits calculations to 
reflect the amount of total IRES subsidized credit as it is distributed among the sectors which supply 
the agriculture sector, acting as a demand shock. The amount spent by agriculture for products from 
other economic sectors is determined using figures from the Brazilian Rural Credit Statistical 
Yearbook, published by the Banco Central do Brasil (Bacen), from 1995 to 2000. 
The direct effects of the demand shocks on each sector are obtained by computing the 
technical coefficients from the I-O table sectorial flow, which generates the technical coefficients 
matrix (A). It is assumed a linear relationship between the acquisitions of a sector and its production 






a =  ,                  (1) 
 
where aij is the proportion of the product of sector i,  demanded as an input by the sector j (x ij) and the 
production gross value of sector j (Xj). 
  Wages, capital and taxes constitute Gross Domestic Product in the I-O table. The direct effects 






m =  ,                  (2) 
 
where Vj represents wages, capital and taxes. 
  To calculate the direct and indirect effects coefficients of a demand shock on income, or the 
income multipliers,  rj, a global effects matrix must be obtained, that is, the Leontief Inverse Matrix, 
[I-A]
-1 ,which is computed by the inversion of the difference between the Identity Matrix (I) and the 
matrix of technical coefficients (A).  Multiplying the row vector of the direct effect of the demand 
shock on income, mj, by the global effects matrix, the direct and indirect effects of the demand shock 
on income coefficients, rj, are obtained 
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where rj represents the direct and indirect effects coefficients.  
  Income multipliers are obtained by multiplying the direct and indirect effects on  the Gross 
Domestic Product with demand shocks (Table 1). 
                                                 
1 This section is based on Haddad (1989).  
 
Table 1. Direct and indirect effects of the Interest Rate Equalization System  
  Sector 1  Sector 2    Sector j  Total 
Demand  D1  D2  …  Dj  ￿ j D  
Taxes  rI1·D1  rI2·D2  ...  rIj·Dj  j Ijj D r · ￿  
Wages  rS1·D1  rS2·D2  …  rSj·Dj  j Sj D r · ￿  
Capital  rC1·D1  rC2·D2  …  rCj·Dj  j Cj D r · ￿  
Total effect  ￿ · 1 1 i D r   ￿ · 2 2 i D r   ...  ￿ · j ij D r   ￿ · j ij D r  
% Relating to 
demand 
( ) 1 1 1 i D / D r ￿ ·   ( ) 2 2 2 i D / D r ￿ ·   ...  ( ) j j ij D / D r ￿ ·   ( ) j j ij D / D r ￿ ·  
 
The I-O table used in this research is from the Brazilian Geography and Statistical Institute for 
1995 (IBGE, 2006). The Fertilizers and Pesticides segments were separated from the Chemical sector 
(Braga, 1999), and the Lime segment was separated from the Not-Iron Minerals sector. Although 
retaining the same coefficients as the original sector, the agricultural sector was separated into Family 
Farm (FF) and Commercial Farm (CF) segments. This division assumes that Family Farms are 
assumed to be less than 100ha as based on the value of production (Guanzirolli, 1994).  This paper 
uses data from Bittencourt (2003), who evaluated the cost of IRES to the government. It is the 
Brazilian Ministry of Finance that determines the amount to be spent by the government on IRES. 
 
3 – Results 
Family Farm (FF) demands and the direct and indirect effects of these demands on GDP are 
shown in Table 2. The FF agriculture segment spent R$ 677.88 million on Fertilizer sector products, 
which had a R$ 38.36 million impact on tax collection, a R$ 130.69 million impact on wages, and a 
R$ 138.40 million impact on capital service payment.   The total effect of this demand for fertilizer on 
Brazilian GDP is R$ 307.95 million, or 45.4% of the total direct spending on fertilizer by members of 
the Family Farm category. The Table’s last column shows the total Family Farm category demand of 
R$ 1,651.19 million, which generated an increase on GDP of R$ 851.73.  In sum, each dollar of 
Family Farm demand was found to cause an increase of R$ 0.51 in Brazilian GDP.  This impact is 
distributed as an increase in tax collection of R$ 82.36 million (5.0%), and increase of R$ 296.86 
million (18%) for wages, and an increase of R$ 472.51 million (28.6%) for capital.  
Commercial farm (CF) demand is shown in Table 3 and the results are analogous to those of 
the FF. The main difference between the CF and the FF is in the amount of demand: total FF demand 
is R$ 1,651.19 million while total CF demand is R$ 4,723.12. CF demand increases GDP 56.6%, 
adding the following amounts to the GDP sectors: R$ 276.49 million (5.9%) for taxes, R$ 793.48 








Table 2. Direct and indirect effects of Family Farm demand on the Gross Domestic Product, 2002/03 
(R$ million). 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Total 
Demand  308.26  99.10  42.74  2.77  677.88  520.44  -  1,651.19 
Taxes  10.43  5.93  2.66  0.13  38.86  24.35  -  82.36 
Wages  77.18  11.18  10.20  0.16  130.69  67.44  -  296.86 
Capital  218.22  25.41  17.07  0.42  138.40  72.99  -  472.51 
Total effect  305.83  42.53  29.93  0.72  307.95  164.77  -  851.73 
% Relating to 
demand 
99.20  42.90  70.00  25.90  45.40  31.70  -  51.60 
1 – Family Farm*; 2 – Lime; 3 – Machines; 4 – Vehicles; 5 – Fertilizers; 6 – Pesticides; 7 - Construction 
* The demand of this sector includes seeds, and animals. 
   
 
Table 3. Direct and indirect effects of the Commercial Farm demand on the Gross Domestic Product, 
2002/03 (R$ million). 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Total 
Demand  625.43  280.23  914.11  41.18  1,434.43  1,069.59  358.14  4,723.12 
Taxes  23.75  16.78  56.83  2.01  82.22  50.04  44.87  276.49 
Wages  90.12  31.62  218.28  2.39  276.55  138.60  35.91  793.48 
Capital  536.18  71.86  365.10  6.25  292.87  150.00  180.12  1,602.38 
Total effect  650.05  120.26  640.21  10.65  651.64  338.64  260.90  2,672.35 
% Relating to 
demand 
103.9  42.9  70.0  25.9  45.4  31.7  72.9  56.6 
1 – Commercial Farm*; 2 – Lime; 3 – Machines; 4 – Vehicles; 5 – Fertilizers; 6 – Pesticides; 7 - Construction 
* The demand of this sector includes seeds and animals. 
 
The increase in GDP caused by CF demand is similar to that caused by FF demand because 
the methodology used to disaggregate the agriculture sector (production value) keeps the same 
coefficients for both sectors. The small difference is explained by the distribution of demand based on 
credit allocation. 
Spending on variable factors and spending on investment impact GDP differently. Table 4 
shows these values for the FF. The main difference between FF  spending on variable factors and 
spending as investment is seen in the capital sector.  Expenditure on investment increases capital rent 
by 56.2%; while expenditure on variable factors increases capital rent by 23.6%. The impacts of these 
two types of spending are different because  of the demand distribution:  65.0% of  FF  investment 
expenditure goes to the family farm sector itself and 16.7% is demanded for Machines (Castro, 2004). 
Of all credit for capital spending, 81.7% goes to these two segments, which is high proportion of capital devoted to direct production costs. It was found that FF spending on variable factors causes a 
smaller impact on GDP (45.7%) than investment spending (83.5%), because the major amount of the 
investment spending goes to the Family Farm and Machines segments that have the largest impact on 
GDP increases (Table 2). 
 
Table 4 – Family Farm Interest Rate Equalization System expenditure impacts on the Brazilian Gross 
Domestic Product by expense, 2002/03. 
  Total Spending   





  R$ million  %    R$ million  %    R$ million  % 
Demand  1,651.19  100.0    1,395.00  100.0    256.19  100.0 
Taxes  82.36  5.0    71.53  5.1    10.83  4.2 
Wages  296.86  18.0    237.66  17.0    59.20  23.1 
Capital  472.51  28.6    328.66  23.6    143.84  56.2 
Total effect  851.73  51.6    637.85  45.7    213.87  83.5 
 
Table 5 shows the results for CF broken down in to spending on investments and spending on 
variable factors.  The results are similar to those calculated for the FF, but the impact  of capital 
spending and the total effect  on GDP are smaller than those of the FF,  again because of the 
distribution of demand among spending segments. 
  For the FF, government IRES expenditure and the impacts of this spending on Brazilian GDP 
are shown in Table 6. In 2002/03, R$ 487.01 million of IRES spending to subsidize the family farmer 
increased Brazilian GDP R$ 851.73 million, implying that each R$ spent on IRES increased GDP R$ 
1.75. Spending on variable factors was found to have a multiplier of 2.19. In addition, agriculture 
sector spending caused a direct effect on government tax collections that represented 16.9% of IRES 
expenditures, reaching 24.5% for spending on variable factors. 
 
Table 5 – Commercial Farm Interest Rate Equalization System expenditure impacts on the Brazilian 
Gross Domestic Product by expense, 2002/03. 
  Total Spending   





  R$ million  %    R$ million  %    R$ million  % 
Demand  4,723.12  100.0    2,679.00  100.0    2,044.12  100.0 
Taxes  276.49  5.9    138.50  5.2    137.99  6.8 
Wages  793.48  16.8    427.48  16.0    366.00  17.9 
Capital  1,602.38  33.9    671.83  25.1    930.55  45.5 
Total effect  2,672.35  56.6    1,237.82  46.2    1,434.54  70.2 
 
 Table 6  – Family Farm Interest Rate Equalization System expenditures effect on Gross Domestic 
Product, 2002/03 (R$ million). 
 
Expenditure 
with IRES  (1) 
Impacts on GDP 
(2) 
Impacts on tax 
collection  (3) 
Multiplier          
2/1 
3/1                   
% 
Total   487.01  851.73  82.36  1.75  16.9 
Spending on 
Variable Factors  
291.59  637.85  71.53  2.19  24.5 
Investment  195.42  213.87  10.83  1.09  5.5 
 
For the CF, government IRES expenditure and the impacts of this spending on Brazilian GDP 
are shown in Table 7. In 2002/03, the Brazilian government’s expenditure of R$ 748.08 million on 
IRES caused GDP to increase R$ 2,672.35, a 3.57 multiplier, and tax collections to increase 37%. Tax 
collections on spending for variable factors compensated for 74.0% of IRES expenditures to subsidize 
the purchase of CF variable factors.  
 
Table 7. Commercial Farm Interest Rate Equalization System expenditures effect on Gross Domestic 
Product, 2002/03 (R$ million). 
 
Expenditure 
wiht IRES  (1) 
Impacts on GDP 
(2) 
Impacts on tax 
collection  (3) 
Multiplier          
2/1 
3/1                   
% 
Total   748.08  2,672.35  276.49  3.57  37.0 
Variable Factors 
Spending 
187.05  1,237.82  138.50  6.62  74.0 
Investment  561.03  1,434.54  137.99  2.56  24.6 
 
  Due to the cost of the IRES program (the difference between the market interest rate and the 
rate paid by the IRES assisted borrower), the multipliers and the tax collection increases are smaller 
for IRES subsidized investment expenditures than for IRES subsidized variable factor expenditures, 
even though the total effects of the investment expenditure are  larger (Tables 4 & 5). IRES cost is 
equivalent to 20.9% of the credit offered to family farms for variable factor purchases but 67.3 % of 
the credit offered for investment spending (Table 8). Therefore, t he higher the cost of the IRES 
subsidy, the lower the amount of resources available to borrowers. 
  The costs to IRES for assistance to commercial farms are less than for assistance to family 
farms because commercial farms pay a higher interest rate than the family farmer on IRES subsidized 
loans. Thus, the same amount spent with through IRES frees a greater credit volume for use by 
commercial farms than for use by family farms (Table 8). Reduced IRES costs make it possible for the 
program to subsidize 14.33 times the cost for credit applied to the purchase of variable factors by 
commercial farms and 3.84 times the cost for credit applied to CF investment spending. For FF, 
increased IRES costs per unit of borrowing reduce the amount of available IRES subsidized credit to 
4.78 times IRES costs for credit applied to variable factor spending and 1.49 times IRES costs for 
credit applied to investment expenditures. We found that this disparity in the subsidized interest rate is 
the main reason that IRES expenditures to subsidize commercial farms have a greater impact on GDP 
than IRES expenditures to subsidize family farms.   
Table 8. Amount of credit available and its relationship to the cost of the Interest Rate Equalization 












FF – Variable Factors  1,395.00  291.60  20.9  11.1  4.78 
FF - Investments  509.00  342.40  67.3  26.8  1.49 
Total / Weighed - Average  1,904.00  634.00  33.3  15.3  3.00 
CF – Variable Factors   2,679.00  186.97  7.0  6.7  14.33 
CF -  Investments  2,665.00  694.51  26.1  24.0  3.84 
Total / Weighed - Average  5,344.00  881.47  16.5  15.3  6.06 
 
4 – Conclusions 
  Each real spent by IRES on family farm generates R$  1.75 increase in Brazilian GDP and 
each real spent by IRES on commercial farm generates a R$  3.57  increase in Brazilian GDP. The 
program’s benefits, measured by an increase of Brazilian GDP, are greater than its costs. Increased tax 
collection also compensates for government expenditures on IRES: 16.9% of IRES expenditures on 
the family farm and 37.0% of IRES expenditures on the commercial farm are returned in the form of 
tax collection. 
  The impacts of IRES expenditures on Brazilian GDP were similar for both family and 
commercial farms because the disaggregation of these two sectors was based on the value of FF 
production while keeping the same production function. To determine the actual coefficients for the 
FF and C F, more accurate analyzes are needed.  Further research is suggested  to evaluate others 
Brazilian government policies for the agriculture sector, such as investigations into price supports, the 
effect of rural credit subsidies in the 1970s, and the impact of infrastructure investment, especially 
transportation infrastructure. 
  The multiplier effect of IRES subsidized credit applied to the commercial farm is double that 
for IRES subsidized credit applied to the family farm because IRES costs for commercial farm credit 
subsidies are lower p er real loaned than those for loans to the family farm.  However, since the 
multiplier effect is positive for both farming segments, IRES generates a major increase in Brazilian 
GDP above program costs. As IRES spending on both the commercial and the family farm has a 
positive effect on GDP, selective application of program assistance can also be used to reduce the 
income disparity that exists in the Brazilian agricultural sector. So,  not only can IRES be used to 
redistribute income among sectors, it could be a policy of income redistribution within one sector.  
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